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ABSTRACT 
Armor is a key component of ground vehicle survivability, as has been developed and 
redesigned throughout history in response to different threats and missions. This thesis 
aims to study and analyze the how armor has changed through major conflicts, from 
World War I to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and some of the driving factors that influenced 
those changes. 
This thesis would also do a discussion on the threats ground vehicles are expected 
to face and how they work, which has significant implications on how armor can be 
designed to defeat them or minimize the damage sustained as a result. 
Finally, this thesis would discuss the various aspects of armor design that can be 
looked at to reduce the vulnerability of a ground vehicle, and how they are characterized. 
This thesis also aims to set a foundation for the development of a ground vehicle 
survivability discipline in NPS in the future.  
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A. BACKGROUND - SURVIVABILITY 
The discipline of survivability has been an area of emerging interest in recent 
decades, particularly for the combat aircraft. For ground vehicles, however, there has 
been a rising interest in the survivability concepts-susceptibility reduction, vulnerability 
reduction and maintainability enhancement–and their influence on the design and 
functions of ground vehicles. One of the key tenets of ground vehicle survivability is 
component shielding, which is largely influenced by armor. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF ARMOR 
The importance of armor has been evident ever since Man was involved in 
conflicts and wars. In order to protect themselves against injury from the enemies’ 
weapons, soldiers realized the need to protect themselves with clothing made from 
stronger materials. This need for protection has also been applied to equipment and 
vehicles. With the introduction of the British Mark I tank during World War I, armored 
operations have become an integral part of land warfare. 
The development of new and more lethal weapons to defeat armor has resulted in 
developments in armor applications as well. Be it the choice of materials or the overall 
hull shape, armor development has and will continue to meet the threats of the day. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a historical background of armor 
development and use on ground vehicles, and the way ahead in the future. 
C. DEFINITION OF ARMOR 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines armor as: 
“The steel or other metallic protective sheathing of a warship, military 
fortification, vehicle or aircraft.” 
In this thesis, the word “armor” shall essentially refer to the protective layer that 
is mounted on a vehicle to prevent damage to its components or injuries to its occupants. 
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With the advancement in materials science, especially the development of ceramics, 
armor may or may not be metallic in this sense. 
D. AN OVERVIEW OF ARMORED VEHICLES 
Despite the common use of the term “armored vehicles” in the thesis, it must be 
recognized it is a collective term that refers to automotive platforms that have additional 
armor protection mounted, beyond what is typically expected of a vehicle. In general, 
armored vehicles can be classified into main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 
armored personnel carriers and self-propelled guns. While the principal considerations 
for armor development and selection may apply for all these platforms, each class of 
armored vehicles may have its own set of special requirements due to its unique missions 
or threats. 
1. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) 
MBTs provide the main firepower for an armored force on the battlefield. Since 
MBTs are usually employed to take out other enemy tanks or key installations, they are 
typically equipped with very heavy armament (greater than 90?mm) and thick armor on 
all sides. In order to carry and operate the heavy armament and armor, an MBT requires a 
large engine and sizeable crew. Consequently, MBTs are very large in size and can thus 
present a significant visual and / or infrared (IR) signature on the battlefield.  
 3 
 
Figure 1.   M1A2 Abrams MBT (From IHS Jane’s 2011) 
2. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) 
As the name implies, APCs are armored vehicles that provide troop transport 
capabilities for armies, similar to transport trucks, except that their armored skin allows 
for better troop protection than soft-skinned vehicles. APCs may be armed with some 
light armament, such as small-caliber cannons and machine guns, for self-protection. 
 
Figure 2.   An M113A3 APC Used by the U.S. Army (From IHS Jane’s 2011) 
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APCs are usually designed with a compartment in the rear to house the fighting 
troops, while the actual operating crew of the vehicle is located in the front or in the turret 
(if any). Despite that, APCs are expected to be smaller in size when compared to MBTs, 
in order to reduce susceptibility and improve mobility through tight terrain.   
3. Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) 
IFVs provide the same function and support to combat troops as APCs, but differ 
in that they are designed to carry men about the battlefield and be a part of the tank / 
infantry team (Foss 1977, 190). Since IFVs typically provide fire support for the 
dismounted troops as well, they are usually equipped with heavier armament (>20mm 
cannons and possibly ATGMs). In terms of armor protection, both APCs and IFVs tend 
to be designed with not-so-heavy threats in mind, such as infantry weapons and, to an 
extent, anti-tank weapons. However, they must also balance the armor protection with the 
effects on mobility, as these vehicles are expected to be very mobile on the battlefield so 
that they can quickly transport troops. 
 
Figure 3.   An M2 Bradley IFV (From IHS Jane’s 2011) 
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4. Self-Propelled Guns (SPGs) 
SPGs are essentially artillery howitzers mounted on automotive platforms, 
typically based on existing MBT or IFV chassis. Since MBTs are already large and heavy 
to start with, the addition of even heavier armament, such as 155mm howitzer guns, 
SPGs are normally larger and heavier, thus resulting in a larger signature than normal. 
 
Figure 4.   M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzer (From IHS Jane’s 2012) 
5. Light Vehicles 
These vehicles refer to vehicles that were originally designed and built as soft-
skinned platforms, and hence did not come with any form of armor protection to start 
with. However, they have become an emerging area of interest in recent conflicts, such as 
the Iraq / Afghanistan conflicts, due to their vulnerability to improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). Such vehicles will tend to be retrofitted with armor (permanent or temporary) as 
an additional layer of protection against threats. Humvees make up a majority of such a 
class of vehicles. 
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Figure 5.   A M1151 Mounted with the Frag Kit 6, an Example of an Up-Armored 
Light Vehicle (From IHS Janes’s 2012) 
6. Other Platforms 
The previously mentioned classes of armored vehicles make up the majority of 
such vehicles today. However, there are also other classes of armored vehicles, such as 
anti-air platforms and reconnaissance vehicles, which are normally based on the same 





II. BEGINNINGS OF ARMOR DEVELOPMENT IN VEHICLES 
More often than not, the development of armor in vehicles, and tanks in general, 
is in response to the threats of the day. Coupled with other factors such as the change in 
warfare and tactics, these resulted in a progressive development of armor through the 
ages. In order to understand the principles and considerations of armor selection and 
design, it is necessary to review the growth of armor through key conflicts in modern 
history. 
A. WORLD WAR I (WWI) 
1. Need for Armor Development 
The large extent of trench warfare during WWI meant that very little ground 
could be gained with infantry forces despite the high attrition rates. Essentially, the 
battlefields of WWI posed two key challenges to the Allied forces: 
• Protection. WWI marked the widespread use of the machine gun by the 
infantry. In land warfare, they were mainly deployed to provide defensive 
cover for against advancing troops. The Germans were known to be 
deploying the Maschinengewehr 08 (MG 08) machine gun, which fired 
7.7mm rounds. The lethality of the machine gun thus provided an impetus 
to use armor for troop protection. However, it could not be simply an 
addition of armored plating on trucks, as they were met with another 
obstacle. 
• Mobility. The trenches that soldiers fought in during that period were 
wide, and covered with barbed wire obstacles. This meant that wheeled 
simply could not cross the trenches. 
Both the protection and mobility requirements thus resulted in the introduction of 
arguably the first modern iconic armored vehicle – the British Mk I tank and its variants. 
 8 
 
Figure 6.   A Mk V Tank Crossing a Trench (From “Mk V Walkaround”) 
2. British Mk I Tank 
The Mk I was known to have armor 10mm thick at the front, 8mm at the sides and 
6mm on the top (Hogg 1980, 17). The survivability of the tank can be seen in the first 
tank offensive in Cambrai in November 1917, when 476 tanks of the British Tank Corps 
gained 4 miles of ground against 1,003 German artillery guns. The outcome of the 
offensive is as follows: 
 
Total Tanks 476 
Direct Hits from Artillery 65 (13.66%) 
Ditching and Mechanical Failure 114 (23.95%) 
Remaining Tanks 297 (62.39%) 
Table 1.   British Tank Casualties after First Day of Cambrai Offensive (After 
Macksey 1980, 34) 
More significantly, the infantry losses were approximately 4000, as compared to 
400000 casualties in a similar advance at Third Ypres, which demonstrates the 
importance of armor not just as an enhancement to vehicle survivability, but also soldier 
survivability. 
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At that point in time, the only weapon that was designed as an anti-tank gun was 
the Mauser 13mm rifle, although modifications made to 7.7cm and 7.62cm Russian field 
guns allowed them for anti-tank use as well (Haythornthwaite, 1993, 97).  
B. WORLD WAR II (WWII) 
1. Anti-Tank Warfare 
WWII saw the rapid build-up of tank production by both the Allied and Axis 
forces, as illustrated below: 
 Germany Britain USA Russia 
1939 249 969 ? ? 
1940 1,460 1,399 331 2,794 
1941 3,256 4,841 4,052 6,590 
1942 4,278 8,611 24,997 24,668 
1943 5,966 7,476 29,497 20,000 
1944 9,161 ? 17,565 17,000 
Table 2.   Tank Production During WWII (After Ogorkiewicz 1968, 36) 
The increasing production numbers as the war progressed was not just due to the 
need to replace destroyed tanks, but also due to rapid development and improvements in 
response to anti-tank threats from both sides. 
• Anti-Tank Weapons. Other than artillery shells that resulted in tank kills in 
WWI, WWII also saw the widespread introduction of anti-tank guns and 
infantry anti-tank weapons. Just like how the forces in WWI needed to 
protect themselves from machine gun fire, the various nations had to 
redevelop their armor to survive hits.  
• Heavier Tank Armament. A miniature arms race developed during WWII, 
where opposing sides improved their firepower to counter armor threats, 
resulting in the improvement of armor (in terms of thickness and design). 
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Looking at the size of the guns on the tanks on both sides, as well as the 
armor characteristics, we can see an increasing trend in both aspects. 
 
Germany Soviet Union 
Tank Main 
Armament 
Armor Tank Main 
Armament 
Armor 
Panzer I 2 x 7.92mm 7–13mm T-26 45mm gun 6–
15mm 








Panzer III 37/50mm gun 30–50mm KV 76.2mm gun 90–
120mm 
Panzer IV 75mm gun 10–80mm T-44 85mm gun 120mm 




Tiger I 88mm gun 60–100mm IS2 122mm gun 95–
160mm 
Tiger II 88mm gun 80–180mm  
Table 3.   Comparison of Major German and Soviet Tanks in WWII (After Hogg 1980 
and Mackasey 1988) 
As can be seen from Table 3, there was a steady increase in both gun calibre and 




2. German Armor Development 
Tank First Production Total Produced Remarks 
Panzer I 1934 1500  
Panzer II 1935 1856?  
Panzer III 1935 5500+?  
Panzer IV 1936 8000+?  
Panther 1942 6000 Response to T-34 
Tiger I 1942 1350 Response to T-34 
Tiger II 1943 4380  
Table 4.   Overview of German Tank Development During WWII (After Hogg 1980 
and Mackasey 1988) 
 
Figure 7.   Comparison of German Armor Thickness with Respect to Soviet Armament 
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3. Allied (British / American) Armor Development 




1941 14000 37mm gun 
M3 Lee 1941 7400 75mm gun 
M4 
Sherman 
1942 41530 75mm gun, 85mm 




1944 20? 90mm gun, comparable 
to Tiger II 
UK Matilda II 1939 2990  
Crusader I 1941 4750  
Crusader 
II 
1941 ?  
Valentine 
II 
1941 8280  
Churchill 
VII 




1943 3000  
Comet 1944 ? Mounted with 77mm 
gun 
Table 5.   Overview of Allied Tank Development During WWII (After Hogg 1980 
and Mackasey 1988) 
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4. Soviet Armor Development 
Tank First Production Total Produced Remarks 
T-26 1931 1660–1717  
T-34 1940 34780  
KV 1940 4515 T-35 Replacement 
IS2 1943 4204 Response to Tiger II 
T-44 1945 200  
Table 6.   Overview of Soviet Tank Development During WWII (After Hogg 1980 
and Mackasey 1988) 
From the above table, one of the key areas of interest is the development of the 
IS2 as a response to the presence of the German Tiger II. First, it was recognized that the 
122mm round would be more effective in penetrating the 80–180mm thick armor of the 
Tiger II, compared to the 76.2mm round. Next, it was also recognized that 47–90mm 
armor of the T-34 was no match for the 88mm round, hence resulting in the thickening of 
armor to a minimum of 95mm. 
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5. Comparison of Armor vs Threats 
 
Figure 8.   Performance of Various Tanks / Field Guns Against Each Other (From 
Macksey 198, 78) 
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Figure 9.   Performance of Various Tanks / Field Guns Against Each Other (From 
Macksey 1988, 102) 
Overall, it can be seen from the development of tanks, as well as their 
performance against one another, that the key theme of armor development during WWII 
was developing thicker armor as a response to the heavier armaments that were 
developed during that period. 
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C. VIETNAM WAR 
1. Troop Protection and the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier 
The Vietnam War was primarily a war “dominated by infantry and firepower” 
(Macksey 1988, 167). However, just like in WWI, there was a need to protect the troops 
during transport, and hence the importance of APCs came into prominence. 
The Vietnam War thus saw the first combat appearance of the M113 APC in the 
form of two companies in April 1962 (Starr 1980, 21), and it was responsible for the 
transportation and protection of infantry troops during battle. A good example of the 
effectiveness of the M113 was in the comparative personnel losses between the Viet 
Cong and the South Vietnamese Army: 
 
 Killed Captured Wounded 
Viet Cong 502 184 - 
South Vietmanese Army 4 - 9 
Table 7.   Personnel Losses Comparison Between Viet Cong and South Vietnamese 
Army (2 M113 Companies) Between 11 Jun-30 Sep 1962 (After Starr 1980, 
22) 
Yet another testament to the effectiveness of the M113 in troop protection was the 
operation of a M113 company in the Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division on 25 September 
in the Plain of Reeds, when the troops were effectively fighting against the enemy, but 
reports indicated that as soon as the infantry troops dismounted the APCs, casualty counts 
increased significantly (Starr 1980, 24). This resulted in the M113 being used as “a 
combat vehicle, used almost as a light tank” (Starr 1980, 24). 
Innovations and modifications made during the Vietnam War also improved the 
protection of the vehicle crew members. The machine gunners, being location above the 
hull, were exposed to enemy fire, and at least 14 gunners were killed at Ap Bac in early 
1963 (Starr 1980, 38). This resulted in the development of the gun shield for the .50-
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caliber machine gun, initially made out of soft steel, but later developed from the armor 
of salvaged vehicles (Starr 1980, 40). 
 
Figure 10.   A Typical M113 Operated by the South Vietnamese Army (Shown without 
Gun Shield) (From Starr 1980, 23) 
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Figure 11.   A M113 with a Gun Shield Modification (From Starr 1980, 74) 
Another modification was the installation of “closely spaced steel bars” on M113s 
in 1966, which is essentially a form of slat armor, for protection against anti-tank rockets 
and grenades (Starr 1980, 43). However, no conclusive results could be obtained during 
the evaluation period, but slat armor would prove to be an important armor development 
during more recent conflicts, as discussed in a later section. 
It should be noted, however, that improvements made to the M113’s armor did 
not reduce the susceptibility of the vehicles. One example would be an escort mission 
that took place in May 1967, during which a platoon had been hit by a Viet Cong 
ambush. Seven M113s were each hit 10 times by antitank weapons and a tank was hit 14 
times (Starr 1980, 108), which demonstrated a high hit probability from enemy fire. 
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Figure 12.   An M113 with Hits from a Viet Cong 57mm Recoilless Rifle (From Starr 
1980, 46) 
2. The Effect of Mines 
As part of the guerilla tactics employed by the Viet Cong, mines were used to 
cause damage to the armored vehicles of the South Vietnamese Army. Some key 
statistics include: 
Period Losses 
June 1966 14 M113 in 8 days 
June 1969 to June 1970 352 combat vehicles 
November 1968 to May 1969 73% of tank losses 
77% of APC losses 
December 1970 75% of combat vehicles 
Table 8.   Vehicle Losses Due to Mines (After Starr 1980, 79) 
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Mines showed the vulnerability of the vehicle hull bottoms, which will also be 
shown in more modern day conflicts, such as OIF / OEF. The damage caused by mines 
tend to be greater on APCs than tanks, as APCs had thinner armor, and tend to be 
carrying more troops, resulting in more personnel injuries / deaths. 
While effort was focused on detecting and avoiding mines, improvements were 
also made to vehicle armor to enhance their survivability against mines.  “Belly armor” 
kits were developed and installed on M113s Sheridans in 1969 (Starr 1980, 82), 
improving their performance against mine blasts. This is an example of the concept of 
applique (add-on) armor, which will be discussed later. 
3. Other Armor Battles 
The Vietnam War also proved to be a battleground between the tanks of the South 
Vietnamese Army and the North Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese Army, equipped 
with M41 tanks, was able to outfight their North Vietnamese counterparts significantly, 
as shown during Operation LAM SON 719: 
Date South Vietnamese Army Losses North Vietnamese Army Losses 
19 Feb 1971 None 6 T-54 
16 PT-76 
27 Feb 1971 3 ACAV 3 T-54 
12 PT-76 
1 Mar 1971 6 ACAV 15 Tanks 
Table 9.   Armored Vehicle Losses during Operation LAM SON 719 (After Starr 
1980, 193) 
The performance of the North Vietnamese tanks’ armor against the HEAT rockets 
of the AH-1G Cobras was also apparent during the operation. Between 8 February and 24 
March, 66 tanks were sighted, with 6 (9.09%) destroyed and 8 (12.12%) immobilized 
(Starr 1980, 194). 
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With the introduction of the Soviet AT3 Sagger missile, the vulnerability of the 
South Vietnamese Army vehicles can be seen as well: 
Date Losses 
23 Apr 1972 1 M48A3 tank destroyed 
1 ACAV destroyed 
1 ACAV damaged 
27 Apr 1972 3 out of 21 M48A3 tanks destroyed 
(14.28%) 
Table 10.   Vehicle Losses Against AT3 Sagger Missiles (After Starr 1980, 210) 
D. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT & 1982 LEBANON WAR 
1. Development of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) 
As a response to shaped charge warheads, explosive reactive armor was 
developed on the Israeli M60 Patton tanks (modified to become the Magach) during the 
1982 Lebanon War. The armor, called Blazer, was developed by Rafael Armament 
Development Authority (Foss 1986, 51), and consisted of explosives sandwiched 
between armor plates (Hilmes 1987, 77). With the detonation of the explosives by the 
strike from the HEAT rounds, the shock waves and movements of the plate elements 
disrupt the shaped-charge jet from penetrating the armor (Hilmes 1987, 77). 
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Figure 13.   An Israeli Tank Column Led by a Magach Mounted with Explosive 
Reactive Armor (From Cooper et al 2003) 
 
Figure 14.   A Damaged Magach 6 During the 1982 Lebanon War (From Cooper et al 
2003) 
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E. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM / OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
1. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom saw the exposure of troops and 
vehicles to not just conventional threats, but also to the new widespread threat of IEDs. 
Primarily shaped charges, their ease of manufacture meant the widespread damage of 
vehicles that were designed mainly for kinetic energy weapons. As a response to the 
threat of IEDs, innovations and developments were made to the vehicles deployed to 
reduce vulnerability and enhance occupant protection. 
2. Protection of Light Vehicles (Humvees) 
As mentioned previously, Humvees are soft-skinned vehicles and were never 
designed for protection against major threats such as IEDs. In order to protect them 
against the focused energy and shaped charge damage mechanisms, the Army Research 
Laboratory (ARL) at Aberdeen Proving Grounds developed and designed the Armor 
Survivability Kit (ASK) for the Humvees (U.S. Army (TACOM) 2004, 6). The fiberglass 
and canvas doors were replaced with armor plate doors with ballistic glass (U.S. Army 
(TACOM) 2004, 5) 
 
Figure 15.   Armor Plate Doors Mounted on the Humvee as Part of the ASK (From U.S. 
Army (TACOM) 2004, 5) 
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As of January 2005, more than 9,400 kits were fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
resulting in a significant number of lives saved. 
3. Protection of Heavy Vehicles (Strykers and M1 Abrams) 
In order to better protect armored vehicles against IEDs, as well as rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs) which were widely used by insurgents, several improvements 
and upgrades were implemented on Strykers and the Abrams MBT: 
• Slat Armor. Even though it was developed during WWII and using during 
the Vietnam War, slat armor (or cage armor) came into greater focus 
during OIF as a response to RPGs. On the Stryker, the cage is spaced 
50cm ahead around the vehicle and detonates the RPG warhead away 
from the vehicle and prevents its hot chemical reaction from boring 
through the armor (Defense Update Jan 2006). The slat armor was 
reported to be effective against HEAT rounds. 
 
Figure 16.   A Stryker IFV Mounted with Slat Armor (From Defense Update Jan 2006) 
• V-Shaped Hull. In an effort to reduce vulnerability of ground vehicles to 
the effects of an IED blast, vehicles such as the Stryker were modified 
with their underbellies having a distinct “V” shape rather than the 
traditional flat surface. The purpose of the V-shaped hull is to deflect the 
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impulse of the blast, so as to disperse the energy and prevent it from 
rupturing the hull. Apart from the Stryker, several other vehicles have 
adopted the V-shaped hull as well, such as the Husky Mk III. As a further 
development, Strykers are now being modified and developed with double 
V-shaped hulls to further strengthen the vehicle from blast effects. 
 
Figure 17.   A Husky Mk III. Notice the Sloped Bottom Hull, an Example of the V-
Shaped Hull (From Critical Solutions International, 2012) 
• Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK). The TUSK was an add-on solution 
designed to enhance the M1 Abram’s ability to meet the threats 
encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Essentially, it was a combination of 
previously used armor enhancements, including the installation of slat 
armor outside the engine compartment and mounting of reactive armor on 
the side skirts (Defense Update Dec 2006). Interestingly, the TUSK also 
includes the gun shield for the external coaxial machine gun, which was a 
key protection feature of the M113 during the Vietnam War. 
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Figure 18.   An M1 Abrams MBT Mounted with a TUSK (From Defense Update Dec 
2006) 
F. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Composite Armor 
In order to improve the performance of armor against threats while minimizing 
the weight increase of the vehicles, composite (or compound) armors were developed in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Such armors would consist of compact arrays with laminated 
elements, or spaced arrays (Hilmes 1987, 77). Perhaps one of the best-known composite 
armors is the “Chobham armor” developed by the British. Although the composition is 
still secret, it is known to be a part-laminated, part-spaced array with elements of steel, 
ceramics and aluminum (Hilmes 1987, 77). By combining the performance of ceramics 
with that of the metals, the Chobham armor allowed for better protection against both 
kinetic energy warheads and shaped charges. The Chobham armor was first used on the 
Vickers Valiant in 1976 (Hilmes 1987, 77) and is widely used on the M1 Abrams and 
British Challenger tanks. 
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Figure 19.   A Challenger 2 MBT (From IHS Jane’s 2012) 
2. Applique Armor 
Lighter alloy armors were used before to minimise the weight of vehicles, but 
they were not as effective due to their lack of hardness. In June 1980, the Vickers Valiant 
tank was the first tank to employ the use of mainly light alloy armor. However, in order 
to further harden the vehicle, it was also constructed with Chobham armor arrays on the 
front and sides (Hilmes 1987, 77), thus providing the first application of applique armor. 
This allowed the flexible configuration of armor thickness based on the threats expected 
in the area of operations. 
G. SUMMARY 
If one were to plot the relative performance of armor throughout history, it will 
look similar to what is shown in Figure 20: 
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Figure 20.   Graph Depicting Increase of Armor Thickness through Time (After Steeb, 
Brendley, Norton, Bondanella, Salter and Covington, 1991, 3)1 
While the thickness of armor has shown a steady increase up till the modern day, 
it has also come to a stagnation point, due to limitations in weight and space on the 
ground vehicle. However, with various innovations, such as ERAs and composite 
materials, the effective performance of armor has increased dramatically, ever since. The 
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III. MISSION-THREAT ANALYSIS 
A. MISSIONS OF ARMORED VEHICLES 
Due to their mobility and firepower, armored vehicles are expected to undertake a 
variety of missions ranging in scale and objective.  
1. Tactical Level 
Given the mobility and firepower that is available on just one platform, several 
armored vehicles within a tactical team can be employed to perform task force missions, 
such as to conduct and ambush on an enemy convoy or a tank-killing mission prior to a 
full-scale assault. 
2. Operational Level 
Within the framework of a combat team or an armor battle group, armored 
vehicles are expected to perform tasks that fulfill one or more operational mission 
objectives, such as: 
• Offensive Operations. Offensive operations are operations “conducted to 
defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources and 
population centers” (Headquarters Department of the Army 2008, 3–6). 
The key advantages of armored vehicles are then well-suited to perform 
the primary tasks of movement to contact, attack, exploitation and pursuit 
(Headquarters Department of the Army 2008, 3–6).  
• Defensive Operations. Defensive operations are operations “conducted to 
defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop 
conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations” (Headquarters 
Department of the Army 2008, 3–8). Since most defensive operations are 
performed from a fixed defensive position, it is important to have a longer 
engagement range than the attacker for more effective defense. With the 
larger caliber armaments available onboard armored vehicles, they 
contribute by allow for a greater stand-off range. 
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• Retrogade Operations. Retrogade operations are withdrawal operations 
that trade space for time. With the importance placed on mobility and 
standoff range, armored vehicles are thus expected to perform a 
combination of the tasks required for both offensive and defensive 
operations. 
3. Support Operations 
Armored vehicles are usually produced as a suite of variants, with the same basic 
chassis mounted with different types of equipment in relation to their functions. Support 
variants of armored vehicles will include artillery, logistics and maintenance variants. 
Therefore, they will be expected to perform operations that support the combat operations 
list above, such as recovery, support fire and medical evacuation. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THREATS 
As the name implies, ground vehicles operate on the ground. However, they face 
a multitude of threats across a wide vertical envelope that spans 360 degrees. Not only do 
they have to contend against  
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Figure 21.   Summary of Threats Faced by an Armored Vehicle (From a Abrams Tank 
System Survivability Briefing in Jan 2012) 
 
Despite the wide range of threats that ground vehicles face from all directions, the 
ways that they inflict damage on armor (ie the damage mechanism) can be essentially 
classified into four different types: metallic solids, metallic jets, fire and blast, with the 
differences only being in the propagators and delivery mechanisms. This can be seen in 
the breakdown shown in Figure 13: 
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Figure 22.   Breakdown of Threats into Delivery Mechanisms, Propagators and Damage 
Mechanisms 
Some of the more common threats to armored vehicles are described below. 
1. Small Arms 
While armor was developed in WWI to offer protection against small arms fire 
from enemy infantry, the threats from small arms fire in today’s context lies mostly with 
armor piercing (AP) rounds, which are specially designed to better penetrate armor than 
typical ball rounds. Such rounds are typically designed to be harder, usually 
manufactured from materials such as hardened steel core for AP machine gun rounds and 
depleted uranium for 50-calibre AP rounds fired from anti-materiel sniper rifles. 
2. Artillery 
During WWI, the majority of tank casualties were the result of hits from artillery 
fire. In today’s context, they continue to pose a threat to armored vehicles, mainly 
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because armor is normally designed with thinner armor on the top. Hence, artillery shells 
are particularly effective when they directly hit armored vehicles from the top. Modern-
day artillery is even more effective with the use of precision guided missiles, which 
provide greater accuracy to directly hit vehicles. 
3. Anti-Tank Weapons 
With the development of the tank in WWI, it was logical to develop weapons that 
are designed for the destruction of tanks. Armored vehicles of today face a multitude of 
anti-tank weapons that are capable of damaging and destroying them, including: 
• Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). RPGs are shoulder-fired weapons that 
fire high explosive (HE) warheads that mounted with rocket motors that 
propel them into flight over a long distance. The damage mechanisms that 
the warheads normally use are blast and fragmentation. 
 
Figure 23.   An RPG-7 Rocket Launcher (From IHS Jane’s 2011) 
• Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM). Missiles are another type of firing 
platforms that deliver the HE warheads to the armored vehicles. After 
firing, such missiles typically seek and track the target vehicles through 
visual or imaging IR seekers that are also installed within the missile. 
ATGMs may be soldier-carried or mounted on vehicles. 
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Figure 24.   A Soldier Firing the Spike ATGM (From IHS Jane’s 2011) 
4. Armored Vehicles 
With their mobility and firepower, enemy armored vehicles are well-suited to take 
out armored vehicles. While most tanks inflict damage through the main guns that are 
mounted on the turrets, some armored vehicles may do so through the use of ATGMs that 
are launched from the vehicle instead, such as the use of TOW missiles on the M2 
Bradley IFV. 
5. Aircraft 
As mentioned previously, armored vehicles are normally designed with less armor 
on the top, making them vulnerable to threats from above. Apart from artillery fire, 
aircraft can also provide that overhead threat. They can inflict damage through: 
• Projectiles. Aircraft can be mounted with machine guns that fire AP 
rounds similar to those fired by ground soldiers. With a higher payload 
capacity compared to soldiers, aircraft can thus deliver heavier and higher 
caliber rounds, thus increasing the probability of penetration in the armor. 
The A-10 Thunderbolt, for example, carries a 30mm cannon that can fire 
AP rounds. This is the similar caliber that can be found on light infantry 
fighting vehicles. 
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• HE Warheads. HE warheads inflict damage in a similar way as artillery 
shells and ATGMs. They can be delivered by means of bombs or guided 
missiles, such as those fired by the AH-64 Apache. 
6. Anti-Tank Mines 
Anti-tank mines anti-tank HE warheads that are packaged and designed to be 
deployed in the ground and to be detonated underneath armored vehicles as they rolled 
over them. Like HE warheads, they use blast and fragmentation damage mechanisms. 
7. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
In the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, vehicles have seen an increased 
threat from IEDs, which are essentially homemade “bombs.”  Due to the homemade 
nature of these devices, their composition can vary and thus cause damage to armored 
vehicles in many ways. Other than the usual blast and fragmentation damage 
mechanisms, IEDs can also inflict damage through shaped charges and explosively 
formed penetrators. 
C. HOW KINETIC ENERGY WARHEADS WORK 
With the initial development of armored vehicles, one of the first damage 
mechanisms that were devised (as can be seen from the damage from artillery in WWI) 
was the penetration of armor using projectiles, ie through kinetic energy. The penetrating 
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where w = weight of projectile, lbf 
 v = velocity of projectile, ft/s 
 d = diameter of projectile, in 
 t = thickness of plate which the projectile only just perforates, in 
 k = constant depending on projectile and target plate (typically 106) 
 n = 1.4 
As can be seen from the de Marre formula, the thickness of the armor should be 
determined based on the type of projectiles that are expected to be fired within the hostile 
environment. Such information can be determined through intelligence gathering. 
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We can verify the validity of the de Marre formula by using it to analyze the 
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of certain projectiles against armored vehicles that we have 
seen in the earlier sections: 
• WWI. Recall that the Germans were widely deploying the MG 08 machine 
gun on the battlefield, firing 7.7mm rounds. Assuming a muzzle velocity 
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With considering the maximum thickness of plate that the rounds would 
penetrate, it is thus no surprise that the MG 08 was ineffective against the 
10mm armor of the Mk I tanks, even at point blank range. Consider, 
instead, the 37mm Tankabwehrkanone, considered the world’s first anti-
tank gun (Hogg 1996, 67). With a muzzle velocity of 650 m/s (2,133 ft/s), 
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Considering that it can penetrate modern light armored vehicles, the 
effectiveness of the Tankawehrkanone as an anti-tank gun is clearly 
evident. 
• WWII. Recall that the German Panther and Tiger I tanks were developed 
in response to the heavy armament of the Soviet T-34 tanks with their 
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Once again, the penetrating power of the round shows the ineffectiveness 
of the Panzer IV’s 80mm armor. Compared to the Panther and Tiger I, 
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however, the T-34 rounds thus become largely ineffective, as it was 
proven on the battlefield. 
• Vietnam War. Consider a 7.62mm round from the AK-47 (a typical rifle 
used by the Viet Cong) on the armor of the M113 (which ranges from 12 
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The de Marre formula shows that a typical rifle round would have been 
largely ineffective against the M113 APC, which was indeed the case 
during the Vietnam War, which resulted in the Viet Cong having to review 
their tactics and use anti-tank weapons to defeat the armor. 
1. Armor Piercing, Composite, Rigid (APCR) 
While the natural response to thicker armor would be to increase the weight and 
velocity of the projectile, there would come a point whereby the total recoil forces acting 
on the firing vehicle would be undesirable. Hence, the APCR round was developed. An 
APCR projectile, due to its lower density jacket, had a higher muzzle velocity, resulting 
in a higher penetrating ability compared to traditional AP rounds of the same caliber. 
2. Armor Piercing, Capped, and Ballistically Capped (APCBC) 
The APCBC is an improvement over the conventional AP projectile in two 
aspects. The first aspect is a soft metal cap added to the tip of the AP round to absorb the 
energy of impact with the target, thus reducing the probability of the AP round shattering 
upon impact and improving the penetration power. The second aspect is the streamlined 
ballistic cap over the soft metal cap to reduce in-flight energy loss, thus improving the 
range and accuracy of the AP round that was affected by the metal cap. Figure 25 shows 
the composition of the APCBC round, with the AP projectile (light grey), soft metal cap 




Figure 25.   Figure Showing the Composition of a APCBC Round (a) and how it 
Penetrates Armor (b) (From Weeks 1975, 13) 
However, APCBC rounds still had a lower penetration capability than APCR 
rounds, as shown below: 
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Figure 26.   Normal Armor Penetration vs Range of Rounds Fired from the German 
88mm L/71 Gun (From Ogorkiewicz 1968, 60) 
Analysis of the American armor against German armament shows their 
performance or lack thereof. The 88mm APCBC ammunition used by the Tiger I tank 
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With such a high penetrating depth, it is evident that Tiger I tank had an 
extremely devastating effect on the 85mm armor of the M4 Sherman tanks that were 
deployed by the Americans. With a difficulty in developing tanks with armor greater than 
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214mm thickness, it was no surprise that the M4 Sherman tanks were unable to go up 
against the Tiger I on a 1-on-1 basis, and could only do so with changes in tactics.
 
3. Armor Piercing, Discarding Sabot (APDS) 
In addition to the higher recoil forces acting on the firing vehicle, larger rounds 
also had the disadvantage of higher drag while travelling to the target, which meant larger 
velocity reduction in the air and hence less penetrating ability. In order to get around that, 
the APDS round was developed to separate the core from the rest of the projectile body 
upon exiting the bore, thus maintaining the advantage of a high muzzle velocity. With the 
lower weight, the round could thus retain accuracy and penetrating ability. Additional 
developments on the APDS round include the addition of fins, resulting in the Armor 
Piercing, Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) round, as well as the use of depleted 
uranium penetrators instead of tungsten alloys in the APFSDS rounds (Ogorkiewicz 
1995, 3). 
 
Figure 27.   Figure Showing the Structure of an APDS Round (a) and the Sabots 
Discarding at the Muzzle (b) (From Weeks 1975, 14) 
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D. HOW BLAST WARHEADS WORK 
The release of energy by high explosives within a warhead can generate a 
pressure wave in the air that can inflict damage on armor as well. This is known as the 
blast damage mechanism. Making use of the blast mechanism, other warheads have thus 
been developed. 
E. HOW METALLIC JET WARHEADS (SHAPED CHARGES) WORK 
1. The Munroe Effect 
The Munroe effect is the fundamental basis with which metallic jet warheads 
operate by. The high explosive charge must have a cavity facing the target, as well as a 
metallic liner. Upon detonation of the explosive charge, the resulting wave collapses the 
liner and thus a high velocity metallic jet is formed that can penetrate armor (Global 
Security 2011). 
 
Figure 28.   A Typical Metallic Jet Warhead (a) and the Metallic Jet Burning through 
Armor (b) (From Weeks 1975, 15) 
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Figure 29.   Armor Penetration of Shaped Charges versus Stand-off Distance (From 
Ogorkiewicz 1968, 65) 
2. High Explosive, Anti-Tank (HEAT) 
HEAT rounds make use of the explosion to generate the shaped charges, jets of 
metal (typically copper) that have high penetrating ability. The formula for depth of 







where L = effective length of jet 
 ρj = density of the jet 
 ρa = density of the target material 
This this indicates that, in order to minimize the penetration depth of the shaped 
charge, the density of the armor material should be significantly higher than that of the 
jet. Given a typical density of 8940 kg/m3 for copper, armor materials can then be 
selected such that the density can limit the depth of penetration. Typical armor materials 
can thus fix the penetration depth as shown: 
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Material Density (kg/m3) Penetration Depth (L) 
Aluminum 2712 1.815615647 
Light Alloy based on Al 2560 1.868739548 
Steel 7850 1.067170794 
Titanium 4500 1.409491634 
Table 11.   Penetration Depth by Shaped Charge through Typical Armor Materials 
The formula for penetration depth thus helps explain the effectiveness of certain 
weapons against certain vehicles: 
• Vietnam War. Consider the RPG-2 on the M113 APC, which had 
aluminum armor. From the table above, we can see that the penetration 
depth would be approximately 1.8 times that of the jet length. This meant 
that a M113 (with maximum armor thickness of 38mm) could only 
withstand an effective jet length of about 21mm, which is exceeded by the 
RPG-2 in real life. Hence, the RPG-2 would have been able to penetrate 
the M113 easily, which was the case in reality.  
3. High Explosive, Squash Head (HESH) 
The HESH projectile was developed in Britain for destroying concrete 
fortifications, but was subsequently adopted for use as tank ammunition (Ogorkiewicz 
1968, 71). It differs from typical HE warheads in that its nose squashes upon impact with 
the target, resulting in an explosion close to the armor surface. This enhances the blast 
effect of the round, generating greater stress waves within the armor and causing 
fractures in the structure. However, what the HESH gains in blast effect, it loses in 
fragmentation and penetration. Therefore, an appropriate countermeasure against the 
HESH is the use of sandwich or layered armor. 
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F. PERFORMANCE OF MODERN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS 
Table 12 summarizes the major anti-tank weapons from around the world, the 
types of warheads they carry and their performance in terms of the depth of armor that 
can be penetrated. 




Swingfire Long Range ATGW HEAT  ? 
LAW 94 Shaped Charge 650mm 
120mm Wombat RR HESH 400mm 
USA 
Hellfire HEAT  ? 
BGM-71D TOW-2 HEAT 800mm 
Shoulder-Launched Multi-
Purpose Assault Weapon HEAA  ? 
M-47 “Dragon” ATGM Shaped Charge / HEAT  ? 
M40A2 RCL HEAT  ? 
Russia 
SPG-9 RCL 73mm Gun HEAT 390mm 
B-11 107mm RCL Gun HEAT 380mm 
T-12 Anti-Tank Gun HEAT / APDS / APHE  ? 
M-1945 (D-44) Anti-Tank Gun HEAT / APHE / HVAP 108mm 
M-1955 Anti-Tank Gun HEAT 380mm 
B-10 RCL 82mm HEAT 240mm 
AT-2 “Swatter” ATGW HEAT 400–500mm 
AT-3 “Sagger” ATGW HEAT 400mm 
AT-4 “Spigot” ATGM HEAT 500–600mm 
AT-5 “Spandrel” ATGM HEAT  ? 
AT-14 “Kornet” Shaped Charge / HEAT  ? 
China 
Type 51 90mm Anti-Tank Rocket 
Launcher HEAT 267mm 
Type 52 RCL HEAT 228mm 
Type 56 Anti-Tank Grenade 
Launcher HEAT 265mm 
Type 65 Recoilless Gun HEAT 240mm 
Type 69 Anti-Tank Grenade 
Launcher HEAT 320mm 
Germany 
Armbrust LAW HEAT 300mm 
Cobra Anti-Tank Missile HEAT 500mm 
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Country Weapon Type of Round / Warhead 
Armor 
Penetration 
Mamba Anti-Tank Missile HEAT 475mm 
Panzerfaust 3 Anti-Tank System HEAT / HESH 700mm 
Israel 
B-300 Light Anti-Armour 
Weapon 
Shaped Charge / 
HEAT 550mm 
MAPATS HEAT 800mm 
Sweden 
Miniman Launcher HEAT 300mm 
PV-1110 RR Hollow Charge 380mm 
Belgium 
MECAR 90mm Light Gun HEAT 350mm 
RL-83 Blindicide HEAT  ? 
RLC-83 Compact Rocket 
Launcher HEAT 300mm 
France 
Apilas Shaped Charge 720mm 
HOT Anti-Tank Missile  ? ?  
Individual Anti-Bunker Anti-
Armour Weapon ABB Shaped Charge 400mm 
SS11 / SS12 ATGM HEAT 600mm 
Lance-Roquettes Anti=Char 
89mm HEAT 500mm 
WASP Individual Assault 
Weapon  ? 400mm 
Table 12.   Summary of Warhead Type and Performance of Various Anti-Tank 
Weapons (After Norris 1996) 
 


















Hollow Charge HESH Shaped Charge HEAT
 46 
The summary shown in Table 12 and Figure 30 shows two key trends: 
• It can be seen that the most common type of round that is used in anti-tank 
weapon designs is the HEAT round. 
• HEAT rounds tend to provide the best penetration capabilities. 
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IV. ANATOMY OF ARMORED VEHICLES 
A. CRITICAL TASKS AND KEY FUNCTIONAL AREAS 





• Communication / Networking 
Hence, the anatomy of an armored vehicle can be broken down into the following 
key areas based on those critical tasks: 
 
Critical Task Key Functional Area 
Propulsion Powertrain (Engine / Transmission) 
Tracks / Wheels 
Control Steering 
Brakes / Suspension 
Firepower Turret 
 Armament 
Protection Hull / Chassis 
Communication / Networking Vetronics / C3 Systems 
Table 13.   Critical Tasks and Key Functional Areas of Armored Vehicles 
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Figure 31.   Key Functional Areas of M1A1 Abrams Tank (From Cooke 2008) 
B. PROPULSION COMPONENTS: POWERTRAIN, TRACKS / WHEELS 
The powertrain is responsible for providing power for the vehicle to propel itself 
during a mission. It consists of the engine, as well as the transmission system. The power 
generated must be transmitted to an interface between the vehicle and the surface that it is 
travelling on. While traditional armored vehicles have employed the use of tracks, more 
modern vehicles (such as the Stryker) use wheels for mobility and psychological reasons. 
 
  
Figure 32.   Comparison of Tracked (Left) (From Cooke 2008) and Wheeled (Right) 
(From Cooke 2009) Propulsion Systems 
C. CONTROL COMPONENTS: STEERING AND BRAKES 
Without any control over the vehicle, the operator of an armored vehicle cannot 
easily direct the vehicle to the desired speed and location. Hence, the ability to accelerate, 
Armament and Turret 
Engine 




decelerate and steer are considered control functions. Components that are included in 
this category include the steering column / linkages as well as brakes. 
D. FIREPOWER COMPONENTS: TURRET AND ARMAMENT 
One of the key tenets of armor operations is shock, which is provided by 
firepower. On an armored vehicle, this is achieved by the integration of a mounted 
weapon, be it a 7.62mm machine gun or a 120mm cannon. While the simplest design is a 
weapon on a fixed mount, most armored vehicles’ weapons are integrated into turrets, 
which provide a means of firing in a direction that is different from the direction of 
travel. In view of reducing gunner susceptibility, modern vehicles may employ the use of 
remote control weapon stations. 
  
Figure 33.   Illustration of Traditional Turret Mounted Gun (Left) (From Zimbio, n.d.) 
vs Remote Controlled Weapon Station (Right) (From Ministry of Defence, 
Singapore 2009) 
E. PROTECTION COMPONENTS: HULL AND CHASSIS 
With the key task of occupant protection, the importance of an armored vehicle’s 
hull cannot be overemphasized. The hull may be of passive or active types. This will be 
further discussed in the application of component shielding in ground vehicles. 
F. COMMUNCATIONS / NETWORKING 
Armored vehicles rarely operate alone, and normally function within the 
framework of a combat team or battle group. Any information that can be shared from 
one vehicle to another can enhance the combat effectiveness of the higher entity, 
resulting in a more decisively victory. 
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G. KILL CRITERIA AND TYPICAL KILL TREE 
A vehicle to assess the survivability of an armored vehicle, there is a need to 
understand the kill criteria (Deitz, Reed, Jr, Klopcic and Walbert 2009, 68): 
• Mobility Kill. Loss of tactical mobility resulting from damage that cannot 
be repaired by the crew on the battlefield. A vehicle has sustained mobility 
kill when it is incapable of executing controlled movement on the 
battlefield. Mobility kill will occur when damage is inflicted upon any of 
the components that contribute the propulsion and control of the vehicle. 
 
Figure 34.   Example of Kill Tree for Mobility Kill 
• Firepower Kill. Loss of tactical firepower resulting from damage that 
cannot be repaired by the crew on the battlefield. A vehicle has sustained 
firepower kill when it is incapable of directing controlled fire from its 
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main armament. This will occur when any components in the armament or 
turret systems are damaged and disabled. 
 
Figure 35.   Example Kill Tree for Firepower Kill 
• Total Kill. A vehicle has sustained total kill when both mobility kill and 
firepower kill occur and the damage is judged not to be economical to 
repair. 
• Personnel Kill. While technically not part of a ground vehicle, personnel 
kill and attrition is still a key aspect of consideration in ground vehicle 
survivability design, since many ground vehicles function as troop 
carriers. Even if a vehicle survives the penetration of a round, the round 
may still be able to injure or kill personnel that are located behind the 
armor. 
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H. LOCATION OF ARMOR ON A GROUND VEHICLE 
With a better understanding of the anatomy of a ground vehicle, and how it may 
be killed / damaged, it is easy to see where armor can be found on a ground vehicle. 
Recall that the purpose of armor is to provide protection to critical components from 
damage. Hence, armor is mounted in the following areas: 
 
Key Components Armor Location 
Powertrain (Engine / Transmission) 
Hull 
Steering 
Hull / Chassis 
Vetronics / C3 Systems 
Occupants / Crew 
Turret Turret Armament 
Brakes / Suspension 
Side Skirts Tracks / Wheels 
Table 14.   Armor Location Based on Vehicle Components 
1. Hull 
The example that best illustrates the concept of hull armor is the British Mk I tank 
that was introduced during WWI. 
 
 
Figure 36.   A British Mk I Tank (From Kempf, n.d.) 
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Figure 37.   Side and Bottom Plan Drawings of British Mk I Tank (From Kempf, n.d.) 
 
Figure 38.   Front and Rear Plan Drawings of British Mk I Tank (From Kempf, n.d.) 
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As can be seen in the photograph and plan drawings above, the best way to 
describe the British Mk I tank is essentially a hardened “box,” which contains the 
propulsion system, armament systems as well as the tank crew. Compared to the ground 
vehicles of today, that fundamental function of hull armor has not changed. The hull 
armor must protect the vehicle contents as follows: 
• Hull Front. Considering that a ground vehicle mostly engages its enemy 
target in the front due to the presence of the crew’s vision and sighting 
system, the hull front is responsible for protecting the crew (driver, 
gunner, loader, assistant) and the engine of the vehicle to ensure its 
continued mobility. 
• Hull Rear. The importance of the hull rear lies in the fact that for most 
MBTs, the engine and transmission are located in the rear of the vehicle. 
However, armor thickness may be sacrificed in the rear to accommodate 
the vehicle exhaust systems, as well as other propulsion components that 
require space. 
• Hull Side. Ground vehicles, especially armored vehicles, typically have 
larger side profiles than front profiles. Therefore, threats have a higher 
probability of hit if they engage the sides. Hence, the hull side is necessary 
to protect the contents of the vehicle. The armor thickness is likely to be 
comparable to that of the front, in view of the higher hit probability. 
• Hull Top / Bottom. While threats from the top and the bottom were not 
traditionally major concerns for ground vehicles, the importance of the 
armor on the hull top and bottom has risen in recent times to protect the 
vehicle against increasing threats from those areas, particularly IEDs from 
the bottom. 
2. Turret 
With the turret providing the firepower capability to armored vehicles, the 
protection of the turret is extremely important to ensure mission effectiveness. The armor 
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protection for the turret is responsible for protecting the firing crew, armament 
components, sighting systems as well as ammunition. Therefore, armor can be expected 
to be found around the turret in the same way as it is found on the hull. Given that the 
turret traverses in all directions even when the vehicle is on the move, there is an equal 
probability of hit from all directions, resulting in armor thickness that is equivalent on all 
sides. Furthermore, the armor has to be particular effective against incendiary rounds to 
prevent the ammunition from catching fire and causing a catastrophic explosion. 
 
Figure 39.   An AMX-13 Light Tank (Note the Sloped Front Side of the Turret) (From 
IHS Jane’s 2012) 
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Figure 40.   A Merkava Mk 3 MBT (From IHS Jane’s 2012) 
3. Side Skirts 
While they may seem insignificant, side skirts can be found in many modern day 
MBTs, as well as IFVs. The sides skirts are responsible for protecting the road wheels 
and suspension systems against threats. 
 
Figure 41.   A Jordanian Centurion MBT (Note the Side Skirt) (From IHS Jane’s 2012) 
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Figure 42.   A Challenger 2 MBT (Note the Thicker Side Skirt) (From IHS Jane’s 2012) 
4. Armor on Non-Traditional Armored Vehicles 
The application of armor on non-traditional armored vehicles, such as wheeled 
vehicles, largely follows the same principles as for tanks. Basically, the armor is located 
over components that require protection from threats. Hence, armor can still be expected 
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V. ARMOR DESIGN FOR VULNERABILITY REDUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
Recall the various types of threats against armored vehicles that were identified in 
Chapter III. Despite the different threats, the warheads that they deliver to the armored 
vehicles generally inflict damage through kinetic energy, blast warheads, metallic jets or 
a combination of either. There is thus a need to understand how the damage mechanisms 




Figure 43.   Figure Showing the Behaviour of Different Types of Warheads on Normal 
Armor (From Macksey 1988, 154) 
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B. THREAT DIRECTION 
It must be recognized that an armored vehicle does not necessarily face the same 
threats in all directions. Therefore, prior to analyzing the effects of warheads on armor, 
there is a need to understand how the probability of hit varies on different sides of the 
vehicle. This, in turn, can affect the necessary protection to be designed. Recall the 
various angles at which the various threats can hit armored vehicles: 
 
Figure 44.   Vertical Threat Envelope (From a Abrams Tank System Survivability 
Briefing in Jan 2012) 
Figure 45 shows the hit probabilities based on the horizontal angle from the front 
of the vehicle. It can thus be seen that the hit probability follows a cardioid distribution. 
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Figure 45.   Hit Probability Variation with Angle from Front of Vehicle (From Steeb, 
Brendley, Norton, Bondanella, Salter and Covington, 1991, 12) 
 
Figure 46.   Probability of Hit on Two-Man MBT from Tank Gun at 1km Range (From 
Steeb, Brendley, Norton, Bondanella, Salter and Covington, 1991, 21) 
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Using a simple assumption of equal damage with each hit, this suggests that the 
armor should be designed to be more effective (either in terms of thickness or hardness) 
closer to the front of the vehicle and can be negligible at the rear of the vehicle. In reality, 
however, that is not necessarily true, as many ground vehicles have critical components 
located in the rear, such as engines and troops. Thus, the design of armor in response to 
hit probabilities may only change subtly, especially in today’s non-linear battlefield, 
where threats are equally likely to be from any direction. 
C. HULL DESIGN 
1. Thickness 
As can be seen from the formulae in the previous sections, an increase in the 
thickness of the hull’s armor plating can reduce the ability of a projectile to penetrate 
completely. As of 1989, the frontal armor of the M1 tank has risen to 1000–1200mm 
RHA against shaped charge and 500–600mm against kinetic energy projectiles 
(Ogorkiewicz 1995, 11). 
However, care must be taken not to have too thick an armor, as it will add 
unnecessary weight to the vehicle, thus increase fuel consumption and suspension 
requirements. To better understand the tradeoff between, it is convenient to calculate the 
marginal increase in weight with any marginal increase in armor thickness. In order to do 
so, a typical model of a tank has to be adopted. An appropriate model uses the 




Figure 47.   Typical Hull Dimensions Model (From Steeb, Brendley, Norton, 
Bondanella, Salter and Covington, 1991, 15) 
As a calculation, an increase in 1mm of steel armor can increase the weight of a 
typical armored vehicle by at least 3,960 kg. Despite the considerations for tradeoff, the 
design of most modern armored vehicles allow for the installation of applique (or add-on) 
armor, which consists of additional protective plates that can be retrofitted onto the 
vehicle to increase the armor thickness and enhance the protection should the threats be 
able to penetrate the existing armor. 
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2. Sloping 
As an alternative to increasing thickness, the sloping of armor can result in the 
simultaneous effects of increasing the effective thickness (in the horizontal) of the armor 
and deflection of AP projectiles and blasts. 
• Effective Thickness. The effect of sloping armor on the effective thickness 






• 30                          60                           90 
Figure 48.   Effects of Inclining Armor on Effective Thickness (From Ogorkiewicz 
1968, 83) 
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As can be seen from Figure 48, inclining armor can drastically increase 
the effective thickness. An incline of 60 degrees can, in actuality, provide 
protection equivalent to twice of the original thickness. 
• Projectile Deflection. By hitting a surface in any way other than head-on, a 
projectile is more likely to be deflected. Increasing the armor sloping 
results in the loss of energy of projectile to change its velocity in the 
direction of the armor’s slope, thus resulting in an inability to penetrate the 







where Ed = energy transferred to armor 
 Ek = incident energy of projectile 
 α = armor slope angle 
Since |sin α| can never exceed 1, the energy transferred to the armor will 
always be lower than the incident energy. 
Typically, projectile deflection is most effective at angles of 50o to 60o. 
However, it must be noted that deflection effects are more applicable to 
low-velocity projectiles that have a low length-to-width ratio. Hence, it is 
more likely for small arms rounds (such as from rifles) to be deflected 
than artillery shells or long rods. 
• Blast Deflection. Apart from deflecting projectiles, hull sloping can 
dissipate the energy resulting from a blast, thus reducing the probability of 
rupturing the hull. This forms the basis behind V-shaped hulls on many 
modern vehicles, such as the Stryker and Husky Mk III. 
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Figure 49.   A Demonstrator Model of the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). Notice the 
V-shaped Hull at the Bottom of the Vehicle. (From Lamothe 2010) 
3. Material 
As mentioned earlier, the armor must be able to withstand penetration by 
projectiles / fragments and damage through blast. Hence, the key properties of armor 
materials are tensile strength to withstand blast and hardness to resist penetration 
(Ogorkiewicz 1968, 83). Right until the 1960s, the most common materials used for 







Material Tensile Strength 
(MPa) 




965–1103 300 7700–8030 
Cast Steel 370 130–235 7700–8030 
Aluminum Alloy 
5083 
317 87 2650 
Table 15.   Tensile Strength and Brinell Hardness of Typical Armor Materials 
Comparing aluminum alloy to cast steel, it can be seen that aluminum offers 
lower tensile strength and hardness, which results in poorer performance as an armor 
material. However, recall the earlier discussion on weight penalty of increasing armor. 
While a 1mm increase in cast iron armor thickness results in a 3,960kg increase in 
weight, a similar increase in aluminum alloy armor thickness merely results in a weight 
increase of 1,337kg. This equates to a 16.7% improvement in performance with a 196% 
greater weight increase. To better improve the tradeoff between performance and weight, 
nickel, chrome and molybdenum are added to steel to increase the hardness and strength 
of the steel. While the weight increase remains the same as with cast steel, the 
performance is 204% better.  
Alternatively, in order to exploit the various properties of different materials 
without incurring too much of a weight penalty, armored vehicles have adopted the use of 
sandwich armor plating, such as layers of ceramics or polymeric materials with basic 
steel (Ogorkiewicz 1995, 12). Such an arrangement has thus resulted in the development 
of composite armor that is “two to three times” as effective as RHA of the same weight 
(Ogorkiewicz 1995, 12). Chobham armor, which was mentioned earlier, is an example of 
such armor. Recall from an earlier section that the M1 Abrams, which utilizes Chobham 




Figure 50.   Figure Showing the Behavior of Different Warheads on Chobham Armor 
(From Foss 1977, 430) 
4. Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) 
Originally used on a large scale on Soviet T-64BV, T-72B and T-80BV tanks 
(Ogorkiewicz 1995, 12), ERA consists of an explosive liner that is sandwiched by two 
metal plates and is mounted on the hull of a vehicle, usually at locations which are more 
susceptible to hits. 
Recall that metallic jet warheads penetrate armor by the rapid extension of a 
molten jet of metal (usually copper). Upon the impact of a warhead, the explosive liner in 
the ERA explodes, thus creating energy that dissipates the energy of the forming metallic 
jet. This prevents the metallic jet from forming properly, thus reducing its effectiveness. 
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Figure 51.   How Explosive Reactive Armor Works (From Berkholz 2009) 
It is important to note that an exploded segment of the ERA can is not 
regenerative, and thus cannot protect the same area against a second shot. Therefore, in 
the design of the ERA in terms of composition, it is necessary to design it such that it is 
not reactive to kinetic energy projectiles or fragments (such as from artillery shells). 
Typically, this is achieved by having a thicker or harder outer face plate, similar to 
designing armor against projectiles. 
Another key point to note about ERA is how the blast from the ERA explosion 
can potentially injure the vehicle’s occupants. Therefore, ERA cannot be mounted on 
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vehicles whose hulls are made of softer materials such as aluminum, which cannot 
withstand the impact of a blast. A way to get around such a problem would be to mount 
an additional layer of steel over the aluminum hull prior to mounting the ERA. The 
Bradley IFV is an example of a vehicle that employs such a technique, with about an inch 
of steel between the ERA and hull. 
5. Slat Armor 
Despite being very effective against RPGs, slat armor is simply achieved by the 
mounting of a cage or fence around the vehicle. It defeats RPG rounds by two means: 
• Stand-off. The first method that slat armor protects a vehicle is by 
providing a physical barrier between the shaped charge and the vehicle 
hull. This allows most of the metal jet to be formed outside of the vehicle, 
and thus it is unable to penetrate the armor. Therefore, when designing the 
slat armor, it must be placed at a distance that is greater than or equal to 
the effective jet length of the threat that the vehicle is expected to face. 
• Prevention of Trigger. Slat armor also defeats RPG rounds by preventing 
the triggering of the fuze. When a RPG round is caught between two bars 
of the slat armor, the nose deforms and is bent inwards, resulting in a short 
circuit of the triggering system. Hence, any signals from the fuze cannot 
reach the detonator, thus preventing the round from exploding. 
 71 
 
Figure 52.   How Slat Armor Defeats an RPG Round (From Novel Defence Engineering 
2012) 
This method of defeating shaped charges thus dictates a key aspect 
of the slat armor design: the cage spacing. In order to maximize the 
probability of effectiveness, the cage spacing must be less than the 
diameter of a typical RPG round. We can notice that most slat armor have 
a cage spacing of approximately 72mm, which is smaller than the 85mm 
diameter of the common RPG-7 round. 
Another method of applying slat armor is demonstrated by the chain links that are 
installed under the turrets of the Merkava MBT. They function in the same way as the 
cage armor does on the Strkyer. Similarly, the spacing between each chain link is 
approximately 78mm, smaller than the diameter of a RPG-7 round. 
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Figure 53.   A Rear View of the Merkava Mk III. Notice the Curtain of Chain Links 
Hanging from the Turret. (From Army-technology.com 2011) 
D. COMMON MODERN DAY STANDARDS 
With regard to the effectiveness of armor in performing its tasks, there are some 
standards that are referred to by many armor developers and nations to assist in the 
design and development of ground vehicles. 
1. MIL-STD 662F – V50 Ballistic Test for Armor 
The purpose of this testing standard is to provide general guideline for 
procedures, equipment, physical conditions, and terminology for determining the ballistic 
resistance of metallic, nonmetallic and composite armor against small arms projectiles 
(From Department of Defense 1987, 1). 
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2. NATO STANAG 4569 - Protection Levels for Occupants of Logistic  
 and Light Armored Vehicles 
Level 
KE Threat Grenade & 
Mine Blast 
Artillery 
Bullet Distance Velocity 
I 7.62 x 51 NATO 
Ball (Ball M80) 
5.56 x 45 NATO 
SS109  













II 7.62 x 39 API BZ 30m 695m/s 6kg Blast AT 
Mine 
 
III 7.62 x 51 AP (WC 
core) 
7.62 x 54R B32 
API (Dragunov) 
30m 930m/s 
(51 AP)  
854m/s 
(54R) 
8kg Blast AT 
Mine 
 






791 or TLB 073 
200m 1258m/s  155mm 
HE at 
25m 










Having looked the development of armor over a period of almost a century, it can 
be seen that the protection of ground vehicles is a function and response to the threats that 
they face. While the simplest way of improving armor is by making it thicker or stronger, 
such a solution will reach a saturation point where it is no longer practical. Already, with 
the development of shaped charges that are capable of penetrating thick armor, armor 
development has to go beyond that of just thickness or materials. This requires the 
constant innovation, as well as a strong understanding of the physics behind threat-armor 
interaction. 
B. WAY AHEAD 
In order to further develop this area of study, there must be more information 
made available to analyze the success or failure of different armor developments. By 
studying the probability of hit and / or kill, the effectiveness of armor can be better 
characterized. Specifically, data from more recent conflicts, such as OIF / OEF would be 
immensely useful and can provide better in-depth analysis. 
Furthermore, studies can be made into the development of armor for susceptibility 
reduction. While this may not have been traditionally a key aspect for ground vehicles, 
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APPENDIX.  APPLICATION OF SURVIVABILITY 
ENHANCEMENT CONCEPTS IN GROUND VEHICLES 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of survivability enhancement is to increase the capability of the 
ground vehicle to avoid, withstand and / or recover from damage in a hostile man-made 
environment (Deitz, Reed, Jr, Klopcic and Walbert 2009, 3). Hence, survivability 
enhancement concepts can be classified under Susceptibility Reduction, Vulnerability 
Reduction and Reparability Enhancement. 
Susceptibility Reduction Vulnerability Reduction Reparability Enhancement 
Noise Deceiving and 
Jamming 
Component Location Maintenance Sensing 
Expendables Component Shielding Forward Maintenance 
Signature Reduction Component Redundancy Recovery with Speed 
Threat Suppression Component Elimination / 
Replacement 
Modular Components 
Threat Warning Passive Damage 
Suppression 
Maintenance Supply Chain 
Resilience 
Tactics Active Damage 
Suppression 
Component Repair 
Table 17.   Survivability Enhancement Concepts 
B. SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION 
1. Noise Deceiving and Jamming 
Jamming techniques are rare, but do exist in the form of infrared (IR) jamming 
systems designed to jam the IR seekers / trackers that are employed by 
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certain anti-tank missiles. One such armored vehicle that utilizes the IR jamming method 
is the Indian Arjun tank. 
2. Expendables 
In order to provide concealment during missions, armored vehicles can employ 
smoke screens. This can be done either through  
• Smoke Grenade Launchers (SGLs). SGLs are usually found mounted on 
the top of vehicles, or at the side of the turrets of armored vehicles. The 
shells are normally launched by means of an electrical switch that is 
triggered from within the vehicle. 
• Exhaust Systems. A smoke screen can also be generated by vaporizing the 
fuel and introducing the vapor into the exhaust system. The main 
advantage of this method is that the smoke screen can be kept for as long 
as required, until there is insufficient fuel left. 
  
Figure 54.   Smoke Concealment Using SGLs (Left, Circled) (From Army Recognition 
Magazine 2007) and Exhaust Systems (Right) (From DefenseImagery.mil, 
n.d.) 
3. Signature Reduction 
Despite their relative large size amongst ground forces, armored vehicles still 
employ several techniques to reduce their signature, thus reducing the probability of 
detection: 
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• Visual. Armored vehicles are usually painted in the same color as the 
environments that they are expected to operate in. Similarly, some 
countries paint their armored vehicles in a camouflage pattern, similar to 
military uniforms. Such a technique aims to blend the vehicle with the 
background, thus reducing the probability of detection by visual means. 
  
Figure 55.   Reduction of Visual Signature: M1A2 Abrams (left) in a Desert 
Environment (From U.S. Army 2011) vs Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicle 
(Right) in a Jungle Environment (From Ministry of Defence, Singapore 
2009). 
• Infrared. Many modern anti-tank weapons (such as the Javelin anti-tank 
missile) employ IR systems as targeting methods or seekers, making use 
of the high temperature regions of armored vehicles (exhaust, engine, solar 
radiation) to track them for the hit. In order to reduce the probability of 
being targeted or tracked, there is a need to reduce the IR signature of 
these vehicles. Methods include painting a vehicle with anti-IR / anti-
thermal paint and covering with a camouflage layer that has a low 
absorption of solar radiation. In general, these methods aim to reduce the 
amount of IR radiation absorbed and emitted by the vehicle, so as to blend 
it with its surroundings. 
 80 
 
Figure 56.   IR Signature of M1A1 Abrams MBT without (1) and with (2) Anti-Thermal 
Paint (From Crane 2005)  
• Acoustic. The amount of noise generated by armored vehicles is 
something that can be used by enemy soldiers to detect their presence 
within the vicinity. The main sources of an armored vehicle’s acoustic 
signature are its engine, exhaust as well as metal tracks. Hence, the 
acoustic signature can be reduced by utilizing wheels instead of tracks, 
replacement of metal tracks with rubber tracks, as well as the installation 
of sound-absorbing materials in the engine compartment to reduce the 
generated noise. 
• Physical Profile. The height, length and width of an armored vehicle can 
influence its visual signature, and thus its probability of detection. While 
most components of an armored vehicle is of a standard size, there have 
been several techniques of reducing the physical profile. One such method 
is to adopt a reclining position for the driver, instead of an upright sitting 
position. This allows the driver compartment to adopt a lower height, thus 
reducing visual signature. Many modern tanks, such as the Chieftain tank 
and M1A1 Abrams adopt such a measure. Another key change in design 
that has influenced the height of armored vehicles is the method of 
cartridge disposal. Modern tanks tend to dispose of empty cartridges out of 
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the vehicle immediately after firing, thus reducing the size required for the 
turret and hence physical profile. 
 
Figure 57.   Crew Layout inside the M1A1 Abrams, Showing the Reclined Driving 
Position (From Cooke 2008) 
4. Threat Suppression 
Since most armored missions have the end state of overcoming an enemy within a 
hostile environment, the ability of an armored vehicle to suppress enemy threats is 
closely linked to its lethality as an offensive weapon. On the individual platform level, it 
is thus important for the vehicle to establish firepower superiority over its threats by 
having more effective armament in terms of range and lethality. This is translated into the 
need to have larger caliber guns than the enemy, or the installation of guided weapons, 
such as TOW missiles on the M2 Bradley. On the tactical / operational level, the 
importance of tactics will be crucial as well. See Tactics for more details. 
5. Threat Warning 
Threat warning can identify both potential and incoming threats, so as to allow the 
armored vehicle operator to take the appropriate action to counter such threats. The key 
enablers for both types of threat warning are: 
• Potential Threats. The main method of identifying potential threats is 
through the use of reconnaissance. This can be done through the 
employment of scouts or other reconnaissance technologies such as 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to capture imagery of the hostile 
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environment for analysis prior to the mission. While such information was 
traditionally reviewed prior to the mission, the pace of modern day 
warfare requires up-to-date information and intelligence to be relayed to 
fighting units. Hence, the use of a battlefield management system allows 
for fighting vehicles achieve better situational awareness and avoid 
potential threats within a hostile environment. 
• Incoming Threats. The use of sensors onboard armored vehicles can allow 
the crew to sense and identify the source of threats. Sensors can make use 
the various signatures of the threats, such as IR or acoustics. For example, 
the Terrex ICV employs a Weapon Detection System (WDS) consisting of 
microphones to detect the location of snipers based on the sound from 
prior shots fired. Similarly, the Arjun tank employs an Advanced Laser 
Warning Countermeasure System (ALWCS) to warning it against 
incoming threats. 
6. Tactics 
Proper planning prior to a mission can help identify potential areas of higher 
susceptibility within the area of operations. Mission planning can also reduce 
susceptibility in the following ways: 
• Support Fire. The employment of support fire, such as artillery strikes and 
close air support, prior to the introduction of fighting vehicles into the 
hostile environment can result in managed attrition of enemy forces. This, 
in turn, will reduce the probability of engagement on the vehicles, 
enhancing survivability. 
• Relative Combat Power. Proper mission planning will also identify the 
combat strengths and weaknesses of both forces, thus allowing tactics to 
be adjusted accordingly. In an armor-on-armor scenario, should the 
enemy’s firepower be superior (either in terms of caliber or range), the 
tactics can then make up for it by increasing the relative combat power. 
An example of such a tactic was the employment of three to four M4 
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Sherman tanks to engage German Tiger tanks during WWII to make up 
for the Tiger’s one-on-one superiority. 
C. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION 
1. Component Location 
With protection being one of the critical tasks of armored vehicles, it is thus 
paramount that components are situated within the confines of the armor protection to 
reduce their vulnerability without sacrificing mission effectiveness. The location of the 
crew and troops within an armored vehicle is an example of how component location can 
enhance a vehicle’s survivability. Furthermore, critical components contributing to the 
same function on the vehicle are usually located together to reduce the vulnerable area. In 
the propulsion subsystem, for example, the engine and transmission gearbox are normally 
located next to each other to give a compact power train package. Its location in the front 
of the vehicle can also help protect the driver. 
2. Component Shielding 
The key to component shielding in armored vehicles lies in the protection that is 
provided by the armor hull / chassis itself. In general, the armor protection must provide 
adequate protection against both blast and penetration effects, which are the most 
common kill modes caused by anti-armor threats. The main aspects of armor selection 
that influence its effectiveness are: 
• Material. The main material properties of interest when it comes to armor 
design are tensile strength and hardness, which affect its ability to 
withstand penetration from a round. Prior to the Vietnam War, armor was 
usually manufactured from steel, which is known to be a very hard 
material. However, with the need to transport more and to produce airlift 
capabilities, many armored vehicles have since been fitted with aluminum 
armor, with the M113 being the first to do so (Macksey 1980, 218). Other 




plastics and fiberglass. It should also be noted that different materials can 
also be used together to reinforce and strengthen the armor against 
variable types of threats. 
• Thickness. With increasing thickness, the armor can provide an increasing 
barrier against penetrators and blast warheads. As shown in the WWII 
example, tank designers normally increase the armor thickness as a first 
step to counter the stronger firepower of enemy threats. In the modern 
battlefield, in order to strike a balance between protection and mobility, 
vehicles can be designed to have add-on armor mounted in scenarios 
whereby the threats are beyond what the vehicles are originally designed 
for. 
• Hull / Chassis Design. As a substitute for increasing armor thickness, 
designers can also adjust the slope of the armor in order to increase the 
effective thickness of protection. It is shown that plates inclined at 50 to 
60 degrees to the vertical can provide the same level of protection as 
vertical plates of much greater thickness (Ogorkiewicz 1968, 82). Other 
than increasing effective thickness, incorporating sloped armor in a hull / 
chassis design can also allow for deflection of projectiles and shrapnel 
away from critical areas, thus reducing vulnerability. Examples of such 
application are the sloping of armor on the German Panther tank in WWII 
and the use of the V-hull on the Stryker, which has provided much 
improved protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in 
recent conflicts. 
• Reactive Armor. In response to the threats provided by shaped charges, 
reactive armor has been developed in order to reduce the penetration 
power of the penetrator. Reactive armor normally consists of explosive 
charges placed over the body of an armored vehicle, being metal plates. 
Upon penetration from a shaped charge, these explosive charges will 
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detonate, creating fragments and blast effects that can either disrupt the 
penetrator or reduce its energy available for penetration. 
 
 
Figure 58.   T-72 Tank with Reactive Armor (From Federation of American Scientists 
2000) 
3. Component Redundancy 
Given the relative small size of armored vehicles compared to aircraft and ships, 
the application of component redundancy with separation can be quite limited. Despite 
this, there are still some key redundant features that can be found on many armored 
vehicles. Some examples of these include: 
• Fuel Tanks. Vehicles such as the Bionix IFV are designed with two fuel 
tanks that are located on both sides of the vehicle. While such a measure 
not only increases the fuel capacity, it also allows reduces the probability 
of critical failure in the event that one fuel tank is hit. 
• Road Wheels. Tracked armored vehicles have multiple road wheels to 
allow a better weight distribution on the tracks and ground. This also 
provides a limited form of redundancy whereby if one or two of the road 
wheels on one side are damaged, the vehicle still remains mobile, albeit 
with possible degraded capability. 
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• Turret Traverse / Elevation System. The turrets on modern day armored 
vehicles are controlled using electronic and / or hydraulic systems. 
However, in the event that the electronic and / or hydraulic circuits are 
damaged, the turrets are usually designed to allow the crew to manually 
control the turrets using hand cranks and gears, albeit at a slower rate. 
• Crew. Tank crews consist of the driver, gunner, commander and loader. 
While most tank crew members are trained for their specialized functions, 
they are usually equipped with basic training in other functions as well. 
This allows certain members to replace others in the event of a member of 
the crew being incapacitated. For example, a commander would have 
undergone gunnery training so as to replace the gunner. However, it must 
also be noted that while there is redundancy, performance will still be 
degraded because of the reduction in overall manpower to perform the 
same number of tasks. 
4. Component Elimination / Replacement 
The speed and ease at which damaged components can be replaced influence the 
turnover rate of damaged vehicles. Fast and effective component replacement can thus 
become a combat multiplier, and improve the overall campaign survivability. This 
effectiveness can be influenced at both the micro and macro levels. At the micro level, it 
is dependent on the design of the vehicle, which in turn influences the location of critical 
components. In the Leopard 2A4 tank, for example, the power pack is designed to be 
removed within 30 minutes, which allows for an extremely fast turnover of vehicles. At 
the macro level, it is affected by the maintenance support concept supporting the vehicles 
(ie level of maintenance, location of maintenance echelons and tools / spares made 
available during the mission). 
5. Active Damage Suppression 
Active damage suppression requires the installation of sensors and systems to 
identify and then reduce or eliminate the effects of the damage that is inflicted on the 
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vehicles. Due to the power requirements of additional sensors and automatic systems, 
they are generally less common than passive damage suppression techniques on vehicles 
which are already facing space and power limitations. One active damage suppression 
technique is the implementation of automatic fire extinguishing systems (AFES) in the 
engine compartments of armored vehicles, which can detect the presence of a fire (due to 
weapon impact or engine malfunction) and thus activate a fire extinguisher within the 
compartment. Also, since the tank crew is considered as a component of an armored 
vehicle, first aid that is applied to injured crew members is also an important active 
damage suppression technique. This emphasizes the importance of crew training to 
manage and deal with scenarios during which the vehicle is hit. 
6. Passive Damage Suppression 
As mentioned previously, in order to minimize power consumption through 
additional sensors and automatic systems, it is generally preferable to incorporate damage 
suppression measures into the overall existing structure of the armored vehicle. Some of 
these measures include: 
• Armor Material Selection. As mentioned before, the choice of material for 
the armor can affect the vulnerability of the vehicle. However, material 
selection must also take into account of any side effects when hit. For 
example, aluminum, while strong, produces fumes that are harmful for the 
occupants of the vehicle when inhaled. Hence, selection of alternative 
materials such as titanium can easily prevent such a scenario from 
occurring. 
• Run-Flat Tyres. For wheeled vehicles, the tyres are considered critical 
components since they transmit the power generated by the engines to the 
ground for propulsion. Deflation of tyres by shrapnel or fragments can 
thus result in lack of propulsion as well as control. The hardening of tyres 
can thus allow them to continue functioning despite any damage. Run-flat 
tyres can take on two possible forms: hardening foam used to inflate tyres 
instead of air, as well as solid tyres that do not require inflation. 
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Figure 59.   An Example of Airless Tyre Installed on a Humvee (From Greenemeier 
2008) 
• Self-Sealing Fuel Tanks. The main damage mechanism that results from 
the penetration of a fuel tank is fire that is perpetuated by the leaking fuel. 
In addition, the loss of fuel can cause vehicles to lose range and hence 
effectiveness. Self-sealing fuel tanks consist of multiple layers of rubber 
that can expand upon absorption of fuel, thus sealing any holes produced 
by projectiles. The Jackal armored wheeled vehicle used by the British 
Army is one such vehicle that utilizes such fuel tanks. 
D. REPARABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
1. Overview 
In order to understand the various concepts that can enhance the reparability of 
armored vehicles, it is necessary to establish the entire repair process chain within a 
battlefield: 
 
Figure 60.   Repair Process Chain 
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The various stages of the field repair process are as described: 
• Vehicle Failure / Damage. This stage refers to the act of the vehicle failing 
to perform one or more of its intended functions due to either failure or 
damage inflicted on one or more of its components. 
• Failure / Damage Detection. This refers to the ability of the vehicle to 
detect the presence of a component failure or damage, with or without the 
knowledge of the operator. 
• Vehicle Recovery. This stage refers to the retrieval of an unserviceable 
vehicle from its current breakdown location to another location which is 
more suited for repairs to take place. That suitable location can either be 
another more sanitized location in the area of operations or a maintenance 
depot that is outside the area of operations. 
• Fault / Damage Isolation. Whenever a fault occurs, it can be a symptom of 
an underlying fault or damage. This stage in the repair process aims to 
identify the exact location and extent of the unserviceable component(s) 
within the vehicle. 
• Unserviceable Component Removal. In order to rectify any faults or 
damages to the vehicle, there is a need to replace the affected relevant 
component. As a first step towards the component replacement, the 
unserviceable component must be detached and removed from the rest of 
the vehicle. 
• Obtain Serviceable Component / Tools. In order to perform the actual 
component replacement, both the spare serviceable component and 
necessary tools must be made available. Hence, this stage refers to the 
steps required to deliver the necessary components and tools to the 
location of repair. The serviceable component can be obtained either 
through a maintenance supply chain or component repairs. 
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• Component Replacement. This stage refers to the final action of replacing 
the unserviceable component with a serviceable one that is obtained from 
the previous stage. Upon the completion of this stage, the vehicle is 
considered to be serviceable, and is ready to be deployed to action again. 
Having understood the various stages of the vehicle repair process, the 
reparability enhancement concepts can be deduced and formulated: 
Stage Reparability Enhancement Concepts 
Vehicle Failure / Damage  
Failure / Damage Detection Maintenance Sensing 
Vehicle Recovery Forward Maintenance 
Recovery with Speed 
Fault / Damage Isolation Maintenance Sensing 
Unserviceable Component Removal Modular Components 
Obtain Serviceable Component / Tools Maintenance Supply Chain Resilience 
Component Repair 
Component Replacement Modular Components 
Table 18.   Reparability Enhancement Concepts 
2. Maintenance Sensing 
Maintenance sensing refers to the use of onboard sensors within a vehicle and / or 
its components that can detect the presence of any faults or damages to the system. The 
purpose of maintenance sensing is twofold: 
• Early Detection and Corrective Action. With constant health monitoring, 
the presence of any faults or damages can be detected as soon as possible 
(preferably upon the onset of the damage). With that, the operator can be 
aware of the damage at the earliest opportunity, thus allowing the 
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necessary corrective actions to be conducted as soon as possible and 
minimizing the vehicle’s effectiveness downtime. 
• Minimizing Compounding Faults / Damages. Any faults or damages 
present in a component within the vehicle can possibly result in the 
subsequent accelerated deterioration of other components that are linked 
to it. As a result, faults and damages can be compounded within a vehicle 
if left unchecked. With the early detection and rectifications, such 
compound damages can be prevented, further reducing vehicle downtime. 
Enablers of maintenance sensing include Condition-Based Maintenance Plus 
(CBM+) that allows “real-time assessment of weapon system condition obtained from 
embedded sensors and / or external tests and measurements using portable equipment” 
(Acquisition Community Connection). 
3. Forward Maintenance 
One of the contributing factors to the turnaround time of a vehicle is the vehicle 
recovery stage. This is particularly so if the area of operations is large, and thus the 
vehicle must be recovered over a long distance. One way to reduce the recovery time is to 
adopt a forward maintenance concept, whereby higher level maintenance capabilities (in 
terms of skillset and spare parts) are deployed forward closer to the frontline instead of at 
the depot level. In order to enable the forward maintenance concept, there must be a high 
maintenance supply capacity and the necessary tools for higher level maintenance (such 
as cranes) must be mobile and ruggedized for the field. An example of such an enabler is 
the Tracked Maintenance Task Vehicle (TMTV) that is deployed by the Singapore 
Armed Forces. Based on the Bronco ATTC, it has a mobile crane and generator, as well 




Figure 61.   A TMTV (Left) Performing Field Repairs (From Ministry of Defence, 
Singapore 2012) 
4. Recovery with Speed 
Should the capabilities or tools required to repair the vehicle be difficult to take 
out into the area of operations, then the recovery of the vehicle must be done in as fast a 
manner as possible to minimize turnaround time. This can be achieved through several 
ways: 
• Wide Recovery Coverage. In order to provide a fast response to any 
recovery needs, there should be a sufficiently wide coverage of recovery 
vehicles such that any damaged vehicle can be reached within a short 
time. This, however, means that there must a large fleet size for recovery 
vehicles. 
• High Speed Recovery Vehicle. Another way to facilitate fast recovery 
response is to design the recovery vehicle to have sufficient high speed so 
that it can keep up with the speed of operations. Hence, most MBTs and 
IFVs usually have recovery variants that have the same automotive 
specifications and speed performance. Examples are shown below: 
 93 
 
Figure 62.   The Buffel Armored Recovery Vehicle (ARV), a Variant of the Leopard 2 
MBT (From IHS Jane’s 2012) 
 
Figure 63.   Recovery Variant of the Bionix IFV (From IHS Jane’s 2011) 
• Automated Recovery Systems. Automated or remote recovery systems can 
allow the recovery crew to perform recovery on damaged vehicles without 
leaving the recovery vehicle itself. This can save precious time from the 
dismounting / mounting action, as well as to allow the recovery crew to 
perform its tasks quickly even in a hostile environment. The Buffel ARV, 
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a variant of the Leopard 2 MBT, employs the Combat Recovery Device to 
perform automated recovery. 
 
Figure 64.   A Buffel ARV Hooking up an Incapacitated Leopard 2A4 MBT Using the 
Combat Recovery Device (From Ministry of Defence, Singapore 2012) 
5. Modular Components 
As discussed earlier, an armored vehicle consists of various subsystems which, in 
turn, are made up of numerous line replacement units (LRUs) which are composed of 
shop replaceable units (SRUs). Normally, the component replacement stage of the repair 
process involves the replacement of LRUs. Therefore, in order to minimize repair and 
turnaround time, the LRUs should be designed to be modular, such that their removal 
requires minimal disconnections, as well as removal of other LRUs which do not need to 
be replaced. Examples of such a modular design can be seen in the Leopard 2 MBT, 
whose turret and engine can be easily disconnected and removed from the vehicle within 
a short time. 
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Figure 65.   Removal of a Leopard 2 MBT Turret (From The Armor Site, n.d.) 
 
Figure 66.   Buffel ARV Lifting a Leopard 2 MBT Engine (From Defense Industry 
Daily 2012) 
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6. Maintenance Supply Chain Resilience 
In order to ensure that the right quantity of the right components / tools is made 
available at the right time, the supply chain for maintenance supplies must be well 
planned and resilient. 
• Pre-Operation Planning. In order to plan for the right quantity of spare 
parts to be held by the various echelons of maintenance entities, there is a 
need to plan prior to the operation, making use of past kill / damage data 
as well as simulations to determine the correct numbers. 
• Replenishment Speed. If the same type of components is being held at 
various locations and / or entities, then the supply chain between each 
location must be robust, so as to allow for the components to be 
transferred and delivered as quickly as possible. 
7. Component Repair 
An alternative to the maintenance supply chain for the replenishment of 
serviceable components is the concept of component repair in the field. The premise of 
this concept is to undertake the repairs of the LRUs (replacement of SRUs, etc) in the 
field, albeit at another echelon instead of sending back to the manufacturer for repairs. 
However, it should be noted that component repair will require more specialized tools, 
skills as well as a larger logistics footprint. Therefore, the implementation should 
balance with any tactical and logistic considerations. 
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